Monday, April 10th 2017
The Suez crisis, unrest in Poland, and the Hungarian uprising “dominated the international news” in 1956. This review of U.S. broadcasting at the time noted “in terms of international communications, the most important was the Hungarian uprising.” The authors counseled that “If policy is unclear, the audience may misperceive it even when operators do not. Reactions may be harmful to the interests of both the communicator and the receivers.”
Article: Foreign Policy and Communications During the Hungarian UprisingRead More
Saturday, April 8th 2017
Major General Edward G. Lansdale (1908-1987) – an Air Force intelligence officer whose career included service in the Philippines during the Huk Rebellion and in Vietnam during that war – was a major thinker and practitioner in counterinsurgency. He emphasized “hearts and minds,” psychological operations, and civic actions. When William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick wrote their influential novel, The Ugly American, “Colonel Hillendale” was modeled on Lansdale.
A memorandum that Lansdale penned in 1963 is frequently cited by scholars, but it has not been available on the web. Lansdale wrote the memorandum for military advisors in Vietnam, but its profile of the images, traits, and behaviors of Americans – touching on professional competence, language skills, accessibility, empathy, directness, enthusiasm, adaptability, patience, humor, temper, and politics -- is evergreen. So is his counsel to “know the country” and “be a good guest.”
Title: MEMORANDUM, From Maj. Gen. Lansdale, Subject: Through Foreign EyesRead More
Thursday, April 6th 2017
The collaboration between the U.S. Information Service in Santo Domingo (USIS/Santo Domingo) and the Army’s 1st Psychological Warfare Battalion during this period was a classic case of successful interagency cooperation in a crisis situation.
Title: Teamwork in Santo Domingo
Author: Bert H. Cooper, Jr.Read More
Thursday, April 6th 2017
Information operations in Malaya were a particularly effective tool that led to the surrender of many insurgents while simultaneously bringing the Chinese population of Malaya onto the side of the government. However, this was the result of years of trial and error during which the British gradually adapted their message to meet the demands of the conflict.
Saturday, March 25th 2017
There are also dangers in accepting a post-truth paradigm. Communicators, experts, and officials may feel overwhelmed and succumb to inaction or, worse, be seduced into adopting “post-truth techniques” that appeal only to emotion and sideline facts or challenging audiences’ beliefs.
Author: Ambassador Bruce Wharton, Acting Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public AffairsRead More