

## **The Pentagon and Public Diplomacy: In Flux**

### **Abstract**

*The US military has a strategic stake and a practical role in achieving public diplomacy objectives, both now and in the future. The practice of public diplomacy, however, is by law assigned to the Department of State. The military is at odds with itself over how to tackle public diplomacy, meanwhile, with numerous internally competing structures within Pentagon operations. Only a greater level of intra-Defense and interagency coordination, mandated at the highest levels of leadership, will resolve these structural and cultural differences and effectively boost US public diplomacy performance.*

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## Introduction

The US Department of Defense faces three major challenges with respect to public diplomacy. The first is the general tension between the Departments of Defense and State over who conducts US public diplomacy. The second challenge is the strain of a military structured for the industrial age and the Cold War transforming in response to the information/post-information age and the new era of conflict exemplified by the Global War on Terror. The third challenge is the conflict between the military's practices of Public Affairs and Information Operations – a tension pre-dating the post-Cold-War transformation yet overwhelmingly affected by it.

The last two axes of challenge, one temporal (transformation) and one stakeholder (Public Affairs versus Information Operations), are intimately related.



The unresolved tensions stretch the military along both axes, with individual players and plans pulling the current state of affairs from one corner to another. As stakeholders rise and fall within the Defense Department and units stand-up and disband, the very definitions of Information Operations, Public Affairs, and new constructs such as “Strategic Communication” shift.

This paper first discusses Department of Defense policy with regard to Information Operations: the locus of military communications practices encompassing most of Defense’s overlap with public diplomacy. It then goes on to explore military practice of public diplomacy and related activities. Recommendations on how to resolve overlaps and tensions complete the paper.

## The Pentagon Does Not Practice Public Diplomacy

The US Code of Law<sup>1</sup> assigns the practice of Public Diplomacy (PD) to the Department of State (DOS), not to the Department of Defense (DOD). Title 22 of the Code regulates State's budget,<sup>2</sup> whereas Title 10 regulates Defense's budget.<sup>3</sup>

The law defines the objectives of PD\* as follows (emphases added):

*...targeting developed and developing countries and select and general audiences, using appropriate media to properly explain the foreign policy of the United States to the governments and populations of such countries, with the objectives of increasing support for United States policies and providing news and information. The Secretary shall, through the most effective mechanisms, counter misinformation and propaganda concerning the United States. The Secretary shall continue to articulate the importance of freedom, democracy, and human rights as fundamental principles underlying United States foreign policy goals.*<sup>4</sup>

The code lays out various components available to achieve these objectives in other parts of Title 22 (e.g. educational and cultural exchanges, in chapter 33<sup>5</sup>), but the core objectives are clear:

- Explain US foreign policy to foreign audiences
- Increase support for US policies among foreign audiences
- Provide news and information to foreign audiences
- Counter misinformation concerning the US
- Articulate the (Enlightened / liberal) values underlying US foreign policy goals

Because the US military has a strategic stake and a practical role in achieving these objectives, which are by law assigned to DOS, practical problems arise in DOD communications doctrine and practice.

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\* While this definition of PD is the current legal definition, it is only one of many that have appeared in governmental publications. The official military definition of PD, for instance, can be found on page 10.

## The Pentagon and Public Diplomacy: Policy

The US Department of Defense, as of 2006, defines the *information environment* as “the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information”<sup>6</sup> – in other words, how the occupants in an area of operations communicate, and where their morale comes from.<sup>7</sup> Many DOD activities dedicated to understanding and affecting the information environment overlap with the practice of public diplomacy. Most notable of these are Psychological Operations and Public Affairs.

### *Information Operations and Related Capabilities as They Relate to Public Diplomacy*

Although not legally mandated to practice PD, several Defense capabilities closely relate to PD and often overlap. An increasingly important aspect of DOD missions is to “gain and maintain information superiority.”<sup>8</sup> In order to do so, the Joint Chiefs of Staff prescribe engaging in *Information Operations* (IO), along with supporting and related capabilities, designed to react-to and/or control the information environment. An explanation of the relationship between the DOD’s approach to information operations and public diplomacy begins with a clear explanation of IO and related functions.<sup>9</sup>

1. IO consists of five integrated practices:
  - a. operations security
  - b. military deception
  - c. psychological operations
  - d. electronic warfare
  - e. computer network operations
  
2. *Capabilities supporting IO* are also five in number:
  - a. information assurance
  - b. physical security
  - c. physical attack
  - d. counterintelligence
  - e. combat camera
  
3. *Related capabilities* consist of:
  - a. public affairs
  - b. civil-military operations
  - c. defense support to public diplomacy

### **Information Operations: Core Practices**

Three aspects of IO are of ancient lineage: Operational Security, Military Deception, and Psychological Operations. *Operational Security* (OPSEC), the identification of critical information and the securing of that information, is the multifaceted but straightforward defense of information from the enemy (such as sentries and firewalls).<sup>10</sup> *Military*

*Deception* (MILDEC) encompasses actions to mislead the enemy, such as feints.<sup>11</sup> Neither OPSEC nor MILDEC closely relate to PD, although MILDEC can at times have ruinous effects on credibility (see page 13).

The DOD activities that most closely relate to PD are *Psychological Operations* (PSYOP):

Planned operations to convey selected truthful information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of their governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. PSYOP are a vital part of the broad range of US activities to influence foreign audiences and are the only DOD operations authorized to influence foreign TAs [Target Audiences] directly through the use of radio, print, and other media.<sup>12</sup>

The similarity of this official definition to that of public diplomacy is so remarkable that it is worth examining the differences:

1. PD is defined as global in scope, whereas PSYOP can be limited to a single issue or a target audience as small as an individual person; this difference in definition is important as it could theoretically limit PSYOP to combat operations while PD generally represents the country as a whole
2. The definition of PD clearly states the centrality of fundamental moral principles, while PSYOP are morally neutral (“originator's objectives”)
3. PD encourages support for national policy; PSYOP are less specific as to ends
4. PSYOP openly focus on changing behavior, while PD focuses more, in its definition at least, on dialog, persuasion, and correction of misunderstandings<sup>13</sup>

Given that the goals of PSYOP are remarkably similar to the goals of PD, it is not surprising that the practices use similar means. PSYOP personnel are encouraged to develop a “thorough understanding of the language and culture of the TA [Target Audience]” and to embrace new media such as the Internet and text messaging.<sup>14</sup> PSYOP are also encouraged to work closely with Public Affairs and Civil-Military Relations, though not, interestingly, with Support to Public Diplomacy.

*Electronic Warfare* (EW) and *Computer Network Operations* (CNO) are newer practices addressing the military's need to disrupt electronic enemy communications and equipment and defend their own.<sup>15</sup> While complex and essential, the practices have little overlap with PD concerns.\*

### **Information Operations: Supporting Capabilities**

Similarly, the five *IO Supporting Capabilities* only tangentially touch on PD. *Information Assurance* (IA), *Physical Security*, *Physical Attack*, and *Counterintelligence* (CI) are defensive and offensive practices for backing-up, securing, and/or eliminating

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\* PD practitioners avoid shutting down enemy websites, for instance, preferring monitoring and even online engagement.

informational resources.<sup>16</sup> *Combat Camera* (COMCAM) provides battlespace imagery via cameras literally mounted on friendly forces.<sup>17</sup> While PSYOP, public affairs, or other units sometimes use COMCAM products,<sup>18</sup> COMCAM as a practice is a technical, non-PD-related activity.

### **Information Operations: Related Capabilities**

The *IO Related Capabilities*, on the other hand, closely tie to PD. Here it is useful to note the military's definition of PD:

1. Those overt international public information activities of the United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.
2. In peace building, civilian agency efforts to promote an understanding of the reconstruction efforts, rule of law, and civic responsibility through public affairs and international public diplomacy operations. Its objective is to promote and sustain consent for peace building both within the host nation and externally in the region and in the larger international community.<sup>19</sup>

Importantly, this definition emphasizes understanding, dialog, multilateral efforts, and especially peace building. In these aspects, it differs from the US legal code's definition of PD (see page 4). In addition, the military definition substitutes practical values like the rule of law and civic responsibility for the US Code's more ephemeral "freedom, democracy, and human rights." These differences are especially important as one examines the practices of Public Affairs, Civil-Military Operations, and Defense Support to Public Diplomacy.

*Public Affairs* (PA) informs "domestic and international audiences" of operations. Credibility is PA's watchword, and the policy guidelines clearly articulate the need to keep IO and PA closely integrated but separate:

PA and IO must be coordinated and synchronized to ensure consistent themes and messages are communicated to avoid credibility losses.... While intents differ, PA and IO ultimately support the dissemination of information, themes, and messages adapted to their audiences. PA contributes to the achievement of military objectives, for instance, by countering adversary misinformation and disinformation through the publication of accurate information.<sup>20</sup>

Importantly, PA speaks to both domestic and foreign audiences. Regarding the latter, PA (and IO) has the role of delivering accurate news to otherwise information-oppressed populations: "Many adversaries rely on limiting their population's knowledge to remain in power; PA and IO provide ways to get the joint forces' messages to these populations." This task is eminently comparable to that of the (officially PD-practicing) Broadcasting Board of Governors' (BBG) Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, which

Provides news, information, and responsible discussion of domestic and international issues to countries where free and independent media are not permitted, or not yet fully established.<sup>21</sup>

Two core differences between PA's defense focus and that of BBG's stations exist in their governing principles, however:

1. Whereas the BBG is designed to maintain independence and objectivity,<sup>22</sup> PA is mandated to withhold information when “release is precluded by national security constraints or valid statutory mandates or exceptions.”<sup>23</sup>
2. While the BBG broadcasts to the world outside of the US, PA’s primary audience, as laid out in the “Principles of Public Information” (see Appendix B), is domestic.<sup>24</sup>

*Civil-Military Operations* (CMO) are potentially even closer in definition to PD than are PA or PSYOP. CMO “are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace.”<sup>25</sup> CMO activities substitute or compliment “local, regional, or national government” services, and as such range from humanitarian aid to health care to law enforcement.<sup>26</sup> CMO operates in “friendly, neutral, or hostile operational areas” and, indeed, “can be particularly effective in peacetime and pre-/post-combat operations when other capabilities and actions may be constrained.”

The reliance of CMO on PA and PSYOP for communications, though, indicates that in practice the latter two remain more likely to overlap with PD. While CMO is important to IO, especially “as the accessibility of information to the widest public audiences increases and as military operations increasingly are conducted in open environments,” CMO operates as an executive arm whose efforts are advertised by PA and PSYOP in order to “affect the perceptions of a broader audience and favorably influence key groups or individuals.”<sup>27</sup>

The last IO-related capability is *Defense Support to Public Diplomacy* (DSPD). The doctrine only briefly describes DSPD, which serves “as part of security cooperation initiatives or in support of US embassy PD programs.”<sup>28</sup> IO as a whole “will be directly linked to PD objectives”, and therefore DSPD facilitates coordination between DOD and other agencies. A later doctrinal draft document takes the definition of DSPD slightly further, less-than-deftly incorporating the DOD definition of PD:

The ability to understand, engage, influence and inform key foreign audiences through words and actions to foster understanding of U.S. policy and advance U.S. interests, and to collaboratively shape the operational environment. This ability can include public information activities as well as information operations to assist selected host nations and the Department of State in reaching foreign target audiences through communication channels such as websites, radio, print, and television.” [sic] DSPD comprises DoD’s support to USG [US Government] public diplomacy, which are [sic] defined as those overt international public information activities of the USG designed to promote U.S. foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad.<sup>29</sup>

As noted earlier, all three related capabilities are to be “coordinated and integrated with” IO, yet “not be compromised by IO.”<sup>30</sup> Commanders, the doctrine specifies, must prize credibility and respect legal differentiations. Under either definition, meanwhile, the

practice of PD – ironically considering the overlaps mentioned previously – remains officially outside of DOD’s bailiwick.

### **Intelligence, IO, and PD**

Beyond the core, supporting, and related IO activities, *Intelligence* plays a major role in the DOD IO doctrine. In at least one activity, *Foreign Perceptions and Human Factors Analysis*, Intelligence activities overlap with PD:

...preparing the modern battlespace... relies on a thorough understanding of the information environment, including foreign perceptions, TA [Target Audience] analysis, and cultural analysis.... Intelligence resources contribute to assessing of foreign populations through human factors analysis, influence net modeling, foreign media analysis, media mapping, polling/focus group analysis, and key communicators/sources of influence analysis.<sup>31</sup>

Despite the connection between understanding foreign perceptions and PD, nowhere under Intelligence does the Joint doctrine mention PD or the DOS, and no cooperation is implied.

### ***Information Operations, Public Diplomacy, and Pentagon Organizational Structure***

The US military divides the world into five, soon to be six, *Combatant Commands* (COCOMs). These roughly encompass North America, South America, Europe and Russia, the Pacific and the southeastern portion of Asia, the Middle East, and, shortly, Africa. Each Combatant Commander is responsible for all US military activity in their region, including IO and related capabilities such as PA and support to public diplomacy.

Combatant Commanders are responsible for their areas of responsibility in peacetime as well as during times of conflict. Under normal, peaceful circumstances, COCOMs use IO primarily to prevent conflicts from breaking out and incorporate IO into the COCOM “theater security cooperation plan” as the means to achieve “specific long-term information objectives.”<sup>32</sup>

Within each Combatant Command, commanders “normally” assign responsibility for IO to a joint (multiple armed forces) staff’s operations directorate, or J-3.<sup>33</sup> The J-3 then creates an *IO Cell*, the Chief of which assembles a diverse team charged with executing IO activities under the orders of the Combatant Commander.

IO Cells vary in their makeup (see Appendix C) but generally include representatives of each of the five core IO capabilities along with a representative from Strategic Command. A PA representative may be included, and again there is a policy emphasis on clear coordination between PSYOP and PA within each IO cell, in order to maintain credibility.<sup>34</sup> Coordination at the Joint level is also required, pulling in other government agencies and allied forces in the area of operations.<sup>35</sup> Other cell staff may include a Judge Advocate (legal) representative, representatives from the IO-supporting capabilities, a chaplain, and/or a DOS representative.<sup>36</sup>

The last two optional IO cell members are worth examining. Chaplains are deemed useful for their knowledge of “relevant information on the religious, cultural, and ideological issues” the cell may encounter.<sup>37</sup> DOS, meanwhile, primarily provides “*PD expertise and advocates PD and DOS interests and concerns* [emphasis in original]” and “coordinates with foreign and intergovernmental organizations that could be or are affected by the implantation of an IO plan.”<sup>38</sup> Model IO Cells do not include a Defense Support to PD representative, suggesting an emphasis on DOS’ PD role. The chaplain’s role, however, is interestingly close to that of a PD practitioner, and the doctrine on IO cells does not mention the potential PD overlap with PSYOP.

When IO activities encompass more than one Combatant Command, authority to coordinate IO falls to the commander of Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM),<sup>39</sup> one of the two DOD Commands with worldwide roles. USSTRATCOM also supports commanders by coordinating interagency support to IO cells when liaisons are not available in the field.<sup>40</sup> The other global command, Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), also has a specified role in IO in that USSOCOM maintains, integrates, and coordinates PSYOP capabilities across DOD<sup>41</sup> – primarily from the US at USSOCOM PSYOP headquarters at Fort Bragg, North Carolina<sup>42</sup> – for the use and support of other COCOMs and USSTRATCOM.

Beyond the execution of IO, which, to repeat, is practiced under the authority of COCOMs or of USSTRATCOM, the DOD maintains IO policy and support bodies. At the Joint level, these include the Pentagon staff responsible for putting together the doctrine itself. At the leadership level they include the link to US Government (USG) civilian leadership that generates all defense policy (*Office of the Secretary of Defense*, or OSD), including the new office of *Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Support to Public Diplomacy* (DSPD).

Set up in 2007, the OSD office of DSPD “helps define objectives and coordinates themes” for the use of the COCOMs,<sup>43</sup> who execute DSPD programs as described above. “I would like it to serve as a transmission belt between the Department of State and Defense, and between policy ideas and actions,” the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the office testified to Congress.<sup>44</sup> The office focuses on Muslim target audiences and on internal DOD communications between the levels of OSD, the Joint Staff, and the COCOMs.<sup>45</sup>

### ***Strategic Communication***

The Joint Chiefs’ IO doctrine defines Strategic Communication as a synchronized USG effort to understand and influence “key audiences.”<sup>46</sup> The doctrine defines the DOD role in Strategic Communication as the execution of IO, PA, and DSPD, especially during times of transition to or from combat situations.

The definition is oddly isolated in the doctrine and essentially describes the task of the IO Cells (described above) from the point of view of a Combatant Commander. The focus on transitional periods and interagency concerns is also unusual in the doctrine.

Whatever the potential future the concept may have had, recent events imply that the era of “Strategic Communication” was brief. Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England established a collaborative planning group for the concept at the Pentagon in 2006 and terminated the group in March 2008,<sup>47</sup> leaving three or four individuals to transfer any documentation that had been prepared over the previous year.<sup>48</sup> While some claim that the dissolution of Strategic Communications Integration was a strictly bureaucratic rearrangement,<sup>49</sup> others note that those at the Pentagon who formerly had “Strategic Communications” on their business cards were instructed to change them to read “Public Affairs.”

Oddly, considering the seeming subordination of strategic communications to PA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Admiral Michael Mullen) who had argued for the project’s dissolution based his decision on his belief that “the Pentagon should focus less on promoting its own story globally.”<sup>50</sup>

## The Pentagon and Public Diplomacy: Practice

The military is doing a great job redesigning itself for 2004.

- US Air Force Officer, 2008

The concept of the information environment emerged from the US military's experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, 2001-2007.<sup>51</sup> The policies described in the previous chapter are very recent in their conception and have yet to be implemented or even fully digested.<sup>52</sup> From a PD point of view, "we [the US military] are stuck in 2002-2003.... A lot of people talk about influencing perceptions, populations, but we're not developing the capacity to do that."<sup>53</sup>

### *Public Affairs versus Psychological Operations*

Prior to the 21<sup>st</sup> century, there was a clear distinction between PA and PSYOPs: "the former spoke to Americans, the later to foreigners."<sup>54</sup> In a traditional peer-to-peer conflict, there were only two external target audiences for communication: the US and the enemy. In today's warfare, however, there are numerous audiences, both internal and external to the battlespace, and there are numerous actors attempting simultaneously to influence these audiences.<sup>55</sup>

The prime example of how the US discovered that the situation had changed traces to Iraq, 2003. Before the US-led invasion, the ministry of information literally ran the Iraqi press.<sup>56</sup> Their thoroughly non-objective habits of selling space and maintaining a politically controlled slant conflicted with the American concept of a free media. After the fall of Hussein, the Iraqi media was unable to cope with the new, free market the invading forces imposed. With no self-regulation, the formerly tightly controlled press was inherited by a variety of groups, generally sectarian militias or criminal gangs, who proceeded to attack one another and, frequently, the invading forces.<sup>57</sup>

"There was a lack of intelligence on how the information environment actually worked in Iraq," notes an American IO officer,

The military did not occupy media or communications outlets; it was not part of the invasion plan. We had to adapt. Eventually the IMN [Iraqi Media Network] was formed. It loosely belonged to the CPA [Coalition Provisional Authority]. They hired Americans to train Iraqis [to be journalists].<sup>58</sup>

Rather than focusing on the realities of the Iraqi information environment, the invading forces had divided tasks between PA, under US Army General Vincent Brooks, which addressed the press of allied nations; and PSYOP, which focused on delivering messages to the Iraqi populations such as "don't support Saddam! Our fight is not with you!"<sup>59</sup>

“We went into Iraq with no integrated communications plans,” notes a US Marines Battalion Commander,

The battle of arms and the battle of ideas must be fought simultaneously.... To do this we need massive interagency interdependence.... PSYOPs and PA were not designed for this information environment.<sup>60</sup>

Realizing the military’s structural inability to deal adequately with the realities of the modern information environment, commanders began an exploration of strategic communications and public diplomacy. They recognized that, while the US military was without peer at fighting and winning set-piece battles, to win non-traditional wars it needed the ability to communicate with local populations (including non-combatants) before, during, and after conflict.<sup>61</sup> PA and PSYOP, developed to communicate with the home front and the enemy, respectively, were flawed tools for this new challenge.

Efforts to bring PA and IO to bear in the new battlespace meant bringing the two into closer cooperation, an exercise fraught with challenges. While the doctrine, explored in the previous chapter, clearly states the need to keep a firewall of sorts between the two functions, many commanders – including many of the most senior commanders suggests one American diplomat who requests anonymity – fail to grasp the distinction. “Commanders still can’t come to terms with the difference,” he notes, “the danger is that there are too many senior commanders with no public affairs background whatsoever.”

The feint on Fallujah is one example of the failure to distinguish between IO (in this case MILDEC) and PA. According to the American diplomat mentioned above, the US forces surrounding Fallujah, Iraq, in the autumn of 2004 were aware that the insurgents in the town were carefully monitoring the media. The press, meanwhile, was continually requesting information from the commanders as to when the invasion would begin. “We haven’t crossed the line,” the PAOs would tell the press daily.

Then one day a young PAO, a female second lieutenant, appeared before the media and announced “we have crossed the line.” Fervent media reporting began immediately, and the DOS representative on hand, disturbed that the military had not informed State, went straight to the senior DOD PAO. It turned out that the US military forces had only nominally crossed the line. They were simply monitoring the insurgent reaction to the news delivered by the PAO. Incensed (not least at the destruction of the young second lieutenant’s credibility and perhaps career), the DOS representative asked why the military had not instead conducted a traditional, convincing feint. “We’re saving American lives,” responded the senior DOD PAO.

Two years later, the official IO doctrine would note that, “while PA should not be involved in the provision of false information, it must be aware of the intent and purpose of MILDEC in order not to inadvertently compromise it.”<sup>62</sup>

Even as the inflexible, home front focus of PA creates tensions in the field, the DOD’s traditional PA efforts, communicating with the domestic audience, have been quite successful. One US ambassador with substantial experience working with the DOD

notes the sincere devotion inculcated in officers and the hyper-awareness of domestic image exhibited by the DOD since the Vietnam War protests of the 1970s.<sup>63</sup> He credits this awareness with the generally successful public relations maintained by the DOD on the home front during the unpopular Iraq war.

PSYOP practitioners, meanwhile, make the argument that they are the officers best practiced in tailoring messages to audiences and hence should be the units to work closely with PD. “Approach is key,” notes a longtime PSYOP officer, requesting anonymity, “tailoring the message.... PSYOP is strategic, we find the possibilities no one considers.”

“You can *train* PAOs to know their audience,” responds the American diplomat quoted earlier,

you *can* train them, they have schools for it. Sadly, they tend to put senior but no-public-affairs-experience guys in charge.... We could create a cadre of PAOs and train them public diplomacy skills.... It could happen, but would take an internal shift... massive training.

The vast difference in PSYOP and PA practice, and IO coordination, from COCOM to COCOM adds to the confusion. In some COCOMs, the IO team trains to drop leaflets; in others, they are highly involved in innovative research into the opinions and beliefs of local audiences.

### ***Structural Tensions***

In 2005-2006, Generals Richard Myers and Peter Pace developed the notion of “shaping the battlefield” into a new *phase* of combat.<sup>64</sup> The military had traditionally divided combat operations into four phases:

1. Mobilization of forces
2. Moving forces into position
3. Battle
4. Hand over to civilian control

Myers and Pace added a “phase zero”: during which the military would shape the information environment through IO and support for civilian efforts such as PD.<sup>65</sup> In a best-case scenario, phase zero would eliminate the need for combat.

Unfortunately, notes a Marines commander, “it’s one thing to make policy, another to change the organization... some people in the Pentagon don’t get it.”<sup>66</sup> The large degree of restructuring implied by this very recent and relatively dramatic alteration in military planning has created quite a bit of tension between the field, immersed as it is in the new era of combat, and the Cold War Pentagon structures. “The guys at the Pentagon don’t have clear mission goals like the Regional Combatant Commanders,” explains an IO staff officer, and there is a “vast distance between DOD orders and our real presence on the ground: generally a 19-year old kid with a machine gun.”<sup>67</sup>

“I’ve been very impressed by the colonels in the field who really get to know people,” notes the American diplomat cited earlier, “they have an amazing ability to adapt... to save ‘their kid’s’ lives.... They’re good at adapting in the field, but terrible in DC.” For instance, only in 2007 were the COCOMs given the task of designing websites aimed at foreign audiences.<sup>68</sup> Previously their own websites aimed at a US audience, in English and along the lines of traditional PA.<sup>69</sup>

The tension created by the USSTRATCOM oversight of all inter-regional IO needs is also palpable, creating tensions between the COCOMs and USSTRATCOM (and SOCOM, when PSYOP are involved).<sup>70</sup> Although funds for IO and related capabilities come straight from each COCOM’s budget,<sup>71</sup> some have accused USSTRATCOM and SOCOM of overreaching their boundaries and attempting to control global IO and PSYOP, respectively, from their headquarters in the US.<sup>72</sup>

### *Defense versus State*

State and Defense share nothing. With vastly different cultural genomes, wildly disparate budgets and personnel strength and organizational structures with no similarities, State and Defense are not designed to interoperate.<sup>73</sup>

DOD and DOS are vastly different in resources, missions, and tactics. Each of these differences adds to the confusion and difficulty of interagency public diplomacy operations.

### **DOD v. DOS: Resources**

Since the end of the Cold War, the USG has increased its reliance on the Pentagon as the primary executor of overseas operations. By redirecting missions and resources from civilian agencies, the USG has continually handed greater responsibility for non-combat operations to DOD.<sup>74</sup> With fewer personnel than in 1987 and a budget held at 2006 levels for the past two years, DOS could not hope to keep up even if the starting point had been the same.<sup>75</sup> “Congress is doing this – that is: the American people,” reports the DOS liaison to DOD, “this is not a DOD plot.”<sup>76</sup> Hence, when Defense Secretary Robert Gates requests more PA activity from DOS, he should take into account that there are more musicians in military bands than foreign service officers in DOS.

A quick comparison: DOS (as of September 2007) possesses a staff of 57,340, of whom 7,813 it posts in 251 locations overseas, along with 37,089 Foreign Service Nationals.<sup>77</sup> DOD, meanwhile, employs about 3,070,000 staff in roughly 5,000 locations.<sup>78</sup> Similarly, the DOS FY 2008 budget is \$34.9B,<sup>79</sup> of which around \$1.6 billion is marked especially for PD, with half of that sum dedicated to broadcasting.<sup>80</sup> DOD’s FY 2008 budget (discretionary, only) is \$623 billion<sup>81</sup> (DOD does not even know how much it spends on PD-related activities, as these numbers are buried in the COCOM budgets<sup>82</sup>).

This huge discrepancy in resources plays out in PD. “COCOMs are getting into politics,” notes the diplomat cited earlier, “they have too much power.” For example,

when [General Anthony] Zinni [CENTCOM commander 1997-2000] arrived in Cairo with a mad entourage, then was followed by the [US] Ambassador to Egypt on a commercial flight with one bodyguard, who do you think the Egyptians noted had the real power?\*

### **DOD v. DOS: Mission**

Starting in late 2007, DOD began paying close attention to the potential of “smart power.”<sup>83</sup> This concept, invented by Harvard Professor Joseph Nye, proposes that countries are more likely to obtain their objectives when they skillfully combine “hard power” (coercion or bribes) with “soft power” (attraction).<sup>84</sup>

Despite a growing awareness of “soft power” as a tool, however, the DOD remains focused on a single mission – the same mission they have had since late 2001: the *Global War on Terror* (GWOT).<sup>85</sup> GWOT drives the military’s involvement in PD and creates tension with DOS, where GWOT – indeed, war in general – is not the sole assignment. Human rights, trade, the environment, etc. play a role alongside the challenge of terrorism in State’s mission. Even within the Pentagon, the unrelenting focus on terrorism limits actors such as DSPD, the head of which would rather be engaging and countering other ideological competitors (such as China) in addition to al Qaeda.<sup>86</sup>

The “W” in “GWOT” reveals the difference: the struggle is not labeled a “Global War” by accident.<sup>87</sup> The British battle against Malayan insurgents, for instance, was termed an “emergency.” Some in the DOD, with their focus specifically on combating violent extremism, even go so far as to question why DOS is not as committed to “the fight.”<sup>88</sup> Others, such as the PSYOP officer cited earlier, note that “in 2001, we should have organized in ‘defense of democracy,’ not in a global war on terror.”

On the other hand, by defining the problem of terrorism as a “war,” the administration assigned DOD the lead in addressing an issue with major public-diplomatic aspects.<sup>89</sup> I.e.: if GWOT is a “war,” DOD has the lead in waging it; yet, as the DOD increasingly recognizes, the struggle against terrorist ideologies includes public diplomacy practice. Hence, GWOT simultaneously pulls DOD into the practice public diplomacy yet only in the context (“war”) which creates divisions with DOS.

### **DOD v. DOS: Tactics**

The structural primacy of PA renders DOD more prone to putting out messages than engaging in conversations. Whereas DOS prefers dialog and engagement, DOD tends to err on the side on an information-centric approach, relying on websites, newsletters, speeches, and (sometimes) media engagement. That is, DOD puts out information to foreign audiences – in peacetime (i.e. not via IO) – in a similar way to how they engage

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\* A decade later, General Zinni, speaking to a mixed but predominantly military audience, was adamant about the need for nuanced, multi-agency approaches to most major problems (Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 13 February 2008).

in PA, and thereby fails to take advantages of changing situations and shifts in public opinion. “It’s not real communication,” notes the DOS liaison to DOD,

It’s not an exchange. They are too plan-centric; they don’t adjust messages as they should – they don’t listen.... Did Tokyo Rose have an impact? No.<sup>90</sup>

This is not to say that the quality of the outbound messaging is poor. Rather, the quality of the DOD communications, which incorporate solid sociological research and invoke valid themes and images, is quite high.<sup>91</sup> The senior officers running the PSYOP programs hire large numbers of contractors to do audience analysis, insist on utilizing qualified and diverse subject matter experts, and work closely with allied governments.

State, on the other hand, does far less US-based contracting. DOS tends to look farther ahead in time, working with local partners who have common interests on each project and simultaneously building long-term relationships.<sup>92</sup> There is also an institutional cultural difference allowing DOS officers more flexibility in their communications. The American diplomat cited above notes that, while DOS allows for some risk-taking in communications, the DOD is ridged in their dealings with the press.

In this business [Defense], 1000 ‘ataboys’ can be removed by one ‘you fucked up.’ So you get an instinctive aversion to talking with the press... most of them would rather be ordered to take out a machine gun nest.

Related to risk aversion is the DOD’s mandated concern to always measure effectiveness,<sup>93</sup> a traditionally challenging task when it comes to PD.

### **DOD v. DOS: Interagency Cooperation**

There is no structure below the level of the White House and National Security Council (NSC) for resolving interagency PD tensions that escalate above the level of the embassy.<sup>94</sup> This includes regional (i.e. multi-embassy) issues. Even within a single country, the ambassador must continually struggle to

Keep the US agencies working within his compound moving in the same direction. More often, he struggles to redirect opposing US policies that emanate from various agency headquarters in DC.<sup>95</sup>

COCOMs, meanwhile, operate at a regional level, where they face interagency issues on a daily basis. CENTCOM, for instance,

*Owns* two countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, on the borders of Iran.... [They are] faced with interagency issues *right now*, and must deal with them without guidance.... [There is a] need to coordinate within legal limits... Title 10 vs. Title 22: different monies, different authorities... plus Title 50 with intelligence.... They see the need to get all the agencies into the room and say ‘what can *you do legally*’ – each has a different role, legally.<sup>96</sup>

“Linking people together is an enormous challenge,” notes Georgetown professor and longtime Foreign Service Officer John Brown, “agencies don’t talk to one another... even within agencies people don’t talk to one another.”<sup>97</sup> Another former FSO echoes his

point: “after the absorption of USIA by the State Department, I was shocked to learn that State only talks to State, or at best The Hill [Congress]... there’s inadequate communication with the field.”<sup>98</sup>

CENTCOM has tackled the interagency issue with Executive Steering Committees, which they form ad hoc to bring decision makers from each agency into the same room.<sup>99</sup> Beyond the crisis situation of the Near East, however, attempts at interagency coordination can quickly devolve into “rice-bowl” (parochial ownership) issues.<sup>100</sup>

## Recommendations

### *Fourth Generation Warfare and DSPD*

“We need to master Fourth Generation Warfare,” notes a Marines battalion commander recently returned from Anbar Province, Iraq, “it’s the dominant form now, especially against non-state actors.”<sup>101</sup> The First Generation of warfare he refers to dates to the 18<sup>th</sup> century, when linear formations faced each other in the field. The Second arrived along with the breech-loading rifle and cannon, which re-introduced the importance of maneuver. The Third was the revolution that ended WWI and eventually evolved into the Blitzkrieg: storm troopers moving rapidly *past* defenses.<sup>102</sup> In Fourth Generation war, the moral element is central, hence the importance of the information environment.

We need the ability to influence perceptions, populations. We’ve got to be in front of the message... honest. And this has to be tied to the structure of operations, tied to media. People need to *know* you’re protecting them.<sup>103</sup>

Defense Support for Public Diplomacy shows promise in this area. The Assistant Undersecretary in charge of the office, Michael Doran, admits that there is currently no mechanism for executing interagency PD.<sup>104</sup> “We’re not organized to do this,” he notes, and we are therefore “losing hearts and minds.” DSPD is specifically working on structures and means to improve communications, regionally and globally, between agencies and within DOD. “We don’t do PD,” claims Doran, citing Title 10 issues, “it looks like PD but it can’t be PD.” What DSPD can do, however, is identify areas where DOS and DOD missions overlap and let COCOMs know how they can better support DOS within the confines of their own mission, and therefore Title 10 funding limits.

There is a caveat, however: DSPD should not replace USIA. Regarding his office, Doran testified that, “we strive to create—or *recreate as some would argue*—a system that supports the dissemination of a single, core message through multiple means [emphasis added].”<sup>105</sup> Later, he told a reporter that

Following the demise of the U.S. Information Agency when it merged with the State Department in 1999, the United States, notably the Defense Department, has lacked a hub to disseminate information around the world.<sup>106</sup>

While it seems unlikely that Doran himself would seek to recreate the USIA within DOD, the threat of mission creep – especially where PD is concerned – is very real.

### *Interagency Cooperation*

While numerous reports call for greater regional USG coordination, there has been little actual research done on the topic<sup>107</sup> and regional interagency practitioners agree that real change will not occur until after the change of administration in 2009.

The creation of AFRICOM, the new regional COCOM, may well prove a new model for interagency cooperation. DOD is structuring AFRICOM around USAID, DOS, DOD, and foreign cooperation. AFRICOM is “not a warfighting command, [it’s] a security-enhancing command,” explains the DOS liaison to DOD, “the lead will always be with Africans.”<sup>108</sup> Doran agrees that AFRICOM is a PD success story;<sup>109</sup> though a former Assistant Secretary of State for African affairs is less sanguine, noting that the current AFRICOM strategy as a whole lacks a realistic PD approach, and “would benefit, overall, from a much greater sensitivity to how the Africans see us.”<sup>110</sup>

On the organizational side, DOS, unlike DOD and the former USIA, has no authoritative interagency decision-making position between the level of Ambassador and the Secretary of State. The advisory and coordinating structures that are in place, meanwhile (Assistant Secretaries of State), do not overlap with the regional COCOMs. Shifting the DOS regions to correspond with the regional COCOMs, and empowering the regional DOS Assistant Secretaries with oversight responsibility for PAOs (if not Ambassadors), would create a clear path for regional PD coordination between DOD and DOS and relatively empower the latter.<sup>111</sup> Doran agrees: “DOS is organized country by country, DOD is regional: it’s one of our strengths.”<sup>112</sup>

Aligning DOS resources along the COCOM regions is not an especially new idea: one ambassador claims that it traces back at least to the Casper Weinberger-George Schultz use-of-force debates of the 1980s.<sup>113</sup> Unfortunately, the opposite has been occurring, as COCOMs have recently been developing country plans – rather than regional plans – coordinated with the DOS country plans “with greater or less success.”<sup>114</sup> “Some of these plans may not be well written and they may not be followed,” adds another ambassador, “but some are excellent and well used.”<sup>115</sup>

There is also a legal prohibition of using Title 10 resources for Title 22 missions, though DOD can place resources at DOS’ disposal so long as there is a shared mission including a clear military goal.<sup>116</sup> For instance, the American diplomat cited earlier recalls supervising a small team of PSYOP soldiers to assist in DOS PD activities in Bolivia.

They were brave soldiers, good with media, but by no means experts on local opinion.... They were useful... but always pushing these leaflets with little cartoons... I had to keep them on a short leash, keep them from doing something stupid. That was my biggest concern.

### ***Public Diplomacy Needs the Pentagon***

Beyond the borders of the US’ closest allies, the military – simply based on its presence – tends to have a front line role when it comes to representing the US in the world.<sup>117</sup>

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DOS structure is traditionally oriented toward stable nation states, not tribal warlords. Yet in today's world of empowered smaller actors and asymmetric conflicts, it is necessary to address both. In situations where PD involves regular assassination attempts and bomb defusing,<sup>119</sup> DOD (or a more militarized DOS) can and should have a role.

Having a role, however, does not mean having the lead. "Please convince State that [DSPD] moves with and for DOS," requests the Assistant Undersecretary of Defense for Support to Public Diplomacy,<sup>120</sup> "we have resources but State has the authorities."<sup>121</sup> Both the President and the Secretary of Defense must continually make this point clear to both the leadership of DOD and of the Congress, otherwise the gravitational force of the overwhelming advantage in numbers and dollars wielded by the military will continue to draw PD responsibility upon DOD.

### *Conclusion*

Executing military operations with an ear to PD is incredibly difficult. In order to avoid the civilian casualties that could lose the hearts and minds which are core to victory, commanders must employ an incredible amount of intelligence. Even more stringent are the combat requirements. Being sure of your target and avoiding collateral damage requires close combat, as in closing with the target face-to-face.<sup>122</sup> The level of training, not to mention individual bravery, that this requires cannot be underestimated. "Each bullet must be followed," describes one commander, "I tell my Marines that they are bow hunting. It's one shot and there's a string attached to it."<sup>123</sup>

Still, thanks to the continuing popularity of Western values, the US may still have more time and flexibility when it comes to repairing our PD apparatus than it may seem. "Our enemies think we're kicking their butts [when it comes to PD]," Doran remarks, "that's just the inherent attraction of the West." Field commanders agree. "The information environment has become a center of gravity [in conflict]," notes a Marines battalion commander, "and it's a source of strength for the enemy so long as the story is too much about us.... We need to make it about the enemy... they suck and we're not telling others how much."<sup>124</sup>

By putting our values first at every level of operation, and by implementing the proposals for better inter- and intra-agency coordination that are increasingly being put forward, perhaps the US can take advantage of this inherent popularity to ride out the current PD deficit and regain our traditional place in world opinion.

# APPENDIX A: IO Activities and Objectives<sup>125</sup>

INFORMATION OPERATIONS INTEGRATION INTO JOINT OPERATIONS (NOTIONAL)						
Core, Supporting, Related Information Activities	Activities	Audience/Target	Objective	Information Quality	Primary Planning/Integration Process	Who does it?
Electronic Warfare	Electronic Attack	Physical, Informational	Destroy, Disrupt, Delay	Usability	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOEPES)/Targeting Process	Individuals, Governments, Militaries
	Electronic Protection	Physical	Protect the Use of Electromagnetic Spectrum	Security	JOEPES/Defense Planning	Individuals, Businesses, Governments, Militaries
	Electronic Warfare Support	Physical	Identify and Locate Threats	Usability	Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (JIPB)/SIGINT Collection	Militaries
Computer Network Operations	Computer Network Attack	Physical, Informational	Destroy, Disrupt, Delay	Security	JIPB/JOEPES/Targeting Process	Individuals, Governments, Militaries
	Computer Network Defense	Physical, Informational	Protect Computer Networks	Security	JOEPES/J-6 Vulnerability Analysis	Individuals, Businesses, Governments, Militaries
	Computer Network Exploitation	Informational	Gain Information From and About Computers and Computer Networks	Security	JIPB/Targeting Process	Individuals, Governments, Militaries
Psychological Operations	Psychological Operations	Cognitive	Influence	Relevance	JOEPES/Jo int Operation Planning	Businesses, Governments, Militaries
	Military Deception	Cognitive	Mislead	Accuracy	JOEPES/Jo int Operation Planning	Militaries
	Operations Security	Cognitive	Deny	Security	JOEPES/Jo int Operation Planning	Businesses, Governments, Militaries
Supporting Capabilities	Information Assurance	Informational	Protect Information and Information Systems	Security	JOEPES/J-6 Vulnerability Analysis	Businesses, Governments, Militaries
	Physical Security	Physical	Secure Information and Information Infrastructure	Usability	JOEPES/Defense Planning	Businesses, Governments, Militaries
	Physical Attack	Physical	Destroy, Disrupt	Usability	JOEPES/Jo int Operation Planning	Governments, Militaries
Related Capabilities	Counterintelligence	Cognitive	Mislead	Accuracy	JIPB/Human Intelligence Collection	Governments, Militaries
	Combat Camera	Physical	Inform/Document	Usability, Accuracy	JOEPES/Jo int Operation Planning	Governments, Militaries
	Civil Military Operations	Cognitive	Influence	Accuracy	JOEPES/Jo int Operation Planning	Governments, Militaries
	Public Affairs	Cognitive	Inform	Accuracy	JOEPES/Jo int Operation Planning	Businesses, Governments, Militaries
	Public Diplomacy	Cognitive	Inform	Accuracy	Interagency Coordination	Governments

Figure I-3. Information Operations Integration into Joint Operations (Notional)

## APPENDIX B: Principles of Public Information<sup>126</sup>




Figure II-1. Principles of Public Information

# APPENDIX C: Information Operations Cell Components<sup>127</sup>




Figure IV-2. Notional Information Operations Cell

## ENDNOTES

A note on sources: a number of contacts interviewed for this paper requested that their comments be strictly “deep background.” These sources, all of whom hold senior positions in the diplomatic corps or private sector, are cited neither in the text nor below. Rather, their input is incorporated in the text without citation.

Other sources requested “background,” or “not-for-attribution” status, and are identified in the text by agreed upon titles but not cited in notes.

All military officers commented on the record, though usually in their capacity as officers and citizens rather than as representatives of their units.

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<sup>1</sup> US House of Representatives, Office of the Law Revision Counsel, *The United States Code*, (Washington, DC), <http://uscode.house.gov/lawrevisioncounsel.shtml> (cited 20 April 2008).

<sup>2</sup> *The United States Code*, TITLE 22 - FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE, CHAPTER 38 - DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Sec. 2732, “Public diplomacy responsibilities of the Department of State,” <http://uscode.house.gov/uscode-cgi/fastweb.exe?getdoc+uscview+t21t25+2618+4++> (cited 20 April 2008).

<sup>3</sup> *The United States Code*, TITLE 10 - ARMED FORCES, Subtitle A - General Military Law, PART I - ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL MILITARY POWERS, CHAPTER 2 - DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, Sec. 113, “Secretary of Defense” <http://uscode.house.gov/uscode-cgi/fastweb.exe?getdoc+uscview+t09t12+45+0++> (cited 20 April 2008).

<sup>4</sup> *The United States Code*, TITLE 22 - FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE, CHAPTER 38 - DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Sec. 2732, “Public diplomacy responsibilities of the Department of State,” STATUTE C, “Objectives” <http://uscode.house.gov/uscode-cgi/fastweb.exe?getdoc+uscview+t21t25+2618+4++> (cited 20 April 2008).

<sup>5</sup> *The United States Code*, TITLE 22 - FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE, CHAPTER 33 - MUTUAL EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM, Sec. 2460, “Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs” <http://uscode.house.gov/uscode-cgi/fastweb.exe?getdoc+uscview+t21t25+2419+92++> (cited 20 April 2008).

<sup>6</sup> US Department of Defense Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 3-13: Information Operations* [JP 3-13] (13 February 2006), I-1.

<sup>7</sup> COL Chuck Eassa, US Army, personal interview, 7 March 2008. [Eassa, now assigned as IO staff to European Command, was Deputy Director US Army Information operations Proponent under then LTG Wallace and LTG Petraeus. Prior to that assignment he was Deliberate Plans Chief, Deputy Chief of Plans, and the Corps Information operations Officer for V Corps, Germany (V Corps was responsible for much of the Army's OIF invasion planning and coordination).] All of Eassa's remarks are his alone as a US Army officer – they are not representative of any military missions or teams.

<sup>8</sup> JP 3-13, ix.

<sup>9</sup> LtCol Todd Desgrosseilliers, US Marine Corps, personal interview, 10 March 2008. [Desgrosseilliers, now assigned to the Manpower Management Division at the U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters at Quantico, Virginia, was Battalion Commander in Eastern Anbar Province, Iraq (between the towns of Ramadi and Fallujah). He is credited as one of the key instigators of the “Anbar Awakening.”] All of Desgrosseilliers remarks are his alone as a Marine officer – they are not representative of any military missions or teams. Also JP 3-13, ix-x.

<sup>10</sup> JP 3-13, II-3.

<sup>11</sup> JP 3-13, II-2.

<sup>12</sup> JP 3-13, II-1.

<sup>13</sup> AMB William Rugh, former US Ambassador to Yemen and the UAE, personal e-mail, 9 May 2008.

<sup>14</sup> JP 3-13, II-2.

<sup>15</sup> JP 3-13, II-4-5.

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- <sup>16</sup> JP 3-13 II-5 to 8.
- <sup>17</sup> JP 3-13, II-7.
- <sup>18</sup> JP 3-13, II-8.
- <sup>19</sup> US Department of Defense Joint Staff, *Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (12 April 2001, as amended through 4 March 2008), 445.
- <sup>20</sup> JP 3-13, II-8.
- <sup>21</sup> Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty, “About RFE/RL,” updated November 2007, <http://www.rferl.org/about/organization/brief.asp> (cited 16 April 2008), para. 2.
- <sup>22</sup> Broadcasting Board of Governors, “About VOA: Journalistic Code,” <http://www.voanews.com/english/about/JournalisticCode.cfm> (cited 16 April 2008),
- <sup>23</sup> JP 3-13, II-9.
- <sup>24</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>25</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>26</sup> JP 3-13 & II-10.
- <sup>27</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>28</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>29</sup> 2008 Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense (JIAMD), *Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 and Supporting Tier 2: Lexicon* (24 August 2006), 39. “Derived from Draft DSPD DoDD xxxx.x; (still in Draft and unnumbered) IO EXCOM brief 27 Jun 05; NMSP-WOT Annex H Appx 1; and JP 1-02.”
- <sup>30</sup> JP 3-13, II-8.
- <sup>31</sup> JP 3-13, III-5.
- <sup>32</sup> JP 3-13, xiv.
- <sup>33</sup> JP 3-13, IV-4.
- <sup>34</sup> JP 3-13, II-2.
- <sup>35</sup> JP 3-13, xiii.
- <sup>36</sup> JP 3-13, IV-7-8.
- <sup>37</sup> JP 3-13, IV-8.
- <sup>38</sup> JP 3-13, IV-8 & 12.
- <sup>39</sup> JP 3-13, IV-1.
- <sup>40</sup> JP 3-13, IV-12.
- <sup>41</sup> JP 3-13, IV-2.
- <sup>42</sup> Michael Doran, Assistant Undersecretary of Defense for Support to Public Diplomacy, personal interview, 27 March 2008.
- <sup>43</sup> Michael Doran (15 November 2007), STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL DORAN DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SUPPORT TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, House Armed Services Committee, United States House of Representatives [Online collection: [http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/TUTC111507/Doran\\_Testimony111507.pdf](http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/TUTC111507/Doran_Testimony111507.pdf)], 8.
- <sup>44</sup> Doran, 15 November 2007, 7.
- <sup>45</sup> Doran, 15 November 2007, 8 & 9.
- <sup>46</sup> JP 3-13, I-10.
- <sup>47</sup> Christopher J. Castelli, “Pentagon Terminates Strategic Communications Integration Group,” *Inside the Pentagon*, 6 March 2008, 1.
- <sup>48</sup> AMB Brian Carlson, Senior Liaison for Strategic Communication for the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, telephone interview, 24 March 2008..
- <sup>49</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>50</sup> Castelli, 14.
- <sup>51</sup> Eassa, 7 March 2008.
- <sup>52</sup> Lt Col Gwyn Armfield, US Air Force, personal interview, 13 March 2008. [Armfield has been a US Air Force special operations squadron commander in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001.] All of Armfield’s remarks are his alone as an Air Force officer – they are not representative of any military missions or teams.
- <sup>53</sup> Desgrosseilliers, 10 March 2008.
- <sup>54</sup> Ibid.

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- <sup>55</sup> Doran, 27 March 2008.
- <sup>56</sup> Gordon Robison, FOXNews: Baghdad Bureau Chief and Coalition Provisional Authority Iraqi Journalist Trainer, personal interview, 27 August 2007.
- <sup>57</sup> Eassa, personal interview, 10 October 2007.
- <sup>58</sup> Eassa, 7 March 2008; confirmed by Robison.
- <sup>59</sup> Eassa, 7 March 2008.
- <sup>60</sup> Desgrosseilliers, 10 March 2008.
- <sup>61</sup> Carlson.
- <sup>62</sup> JP 3-13, II-3.
- <sup>63</sup> AMB Robert Callahan, US Ambassador to Nicaragua [previously Director of Public Diplomacy in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence], personal interview, 29 March 2008.
- <sup>64</sup> Carlson.
- <sup>65</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>66</sup> Desgrosseilliers, 10 March 2008.
- <sup>67</sup> Eassa, 7 March 2008.
- <sup>68</sup> Carlson.
- <sup>69</sup> DOD sponsored two regional specific news sites prior to 2007, though these were neither COCOM sites nor obviously Pentagon-produced. See Peter Eisler, "Pentagon Launches Foreign News Websites," USA Today, updated 1 May 2008, [http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2008-04-30-sites\\_N.htm](http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/2008-04-30-sites_N.htm) (cited 27 June 2008).
- <sup>70</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>71</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>72</sup> Doran, 27 March 2008.
- <sup>73</sup> COL John Tien, USAR, LtCol Todd Desgrosseilliers, and Lt Col Gwyn Armfield, USAF, "Winning the Long War: Applying the US Government's Smart Power in Current and Future Conflicts" (unpublished draft Research Report, Harvard Kennedy School, 13 March 2008), 5.
- <sup>74</sup> Carlson.
- <sup>75</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>76</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>77</sup> Tien et al, 6.
- <sup>78</sup> Tien et al, 8.
- <sup>79</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>80</sup> Rugh.
- <sup>81</sup> Tien et al, 8.
- <sup>82</sup> Carlson.
- <sup>83</sup> Tien et al, 4-5.
- <sup>84</sup> Joseph Nye, personal interview, 10 March 2008.
- <sup>85</sup> Carlson.
- <sup>86</sup> Doran, 27 March 2008.
- <sup>87</sup> Carlson.
- <sup>88</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>89</sup> Rugh.
- <sup>90</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>91</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>92</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>93</sup> John Brown, Research Associate at Georgetown's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy and former Foreign Service Officer, personal interview, 28 March 2008.
- <sup>94</sup> Tien et al, 8.
- <sup>95</sup> Tien et al, 9.
- <sup>96</sup> Armfield.
- <sup>97</sup> Brown.
- <sup>98</sup> Marianne Scott, Our Voices Together: Executive Director, personal interview, 7 January 2008.
- <sup>99</sup> Armfield.

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- <sup>100</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>101</sup> Desgrosseilliers, 10 March 2008.
- <sup>102</sup> Desgrosseilliers, 10 March 2008.
- <sup>103</sup> Desgrosseilliers, 10 March 2008.
- <sup>104</sup> Doran, 27 March 2008.
- <sup>105</sup> Doran, 15 November 2007, 8.
- <sup>106</sup> Fawzia Sheikh, "Doran Advocates Strategic Center of Information to Replace USIA," *Inside the Pentagon*, 6 March 2008, 14.
- <sup>107</sup> Tien et al, 4.
- <sup>108</sup> Carlson.
- <sup>109</sup> Doran, 27 March 2008.
- <sup>110</sup> Richard Moose, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, "Re: AFRICOM," personal e-mail, 20 April 2008.
- <sup>111</sup> Tien et al, 13-14.
- <sup>112</sup> Doran, 27 March 2008.
- <sup>113</sup> Callahan.
- <sup>114</sup> Carlson.
- <sup>115</sup> Rugh.
- <sup>116</sup> Doran, 27 March 2008.
- <sup>117</sup> Carlson.
- <sup>118</sup> Armfield.
- <sup>119</sup> Desgrosseilliers, 16 April 2008.
- <sup>120</sup> Doran, 27 March 2008.
- <sup>121</sup> Fawzia Sheikh, "Public Diplomacy Shop Mulls Strategic Issues Like China, Energy," *Inside the Pentagon*, 6 March 2008, 16.
- <sup>122</sup> Desgrosseilliers, personal interview, 15 April 2008.
- <sup>123</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>124</sup> Desgrosseilliers, 10 March 2008.
- <sup>125</sup> JP 3-13, I-7.
- <sup>126</sup> JP 3-13, II-9.
- <sup>127</sup> JP 3-13, IV-5.